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OAKESHOTT ON HEGEL’S ‘INJUDICIOUS’ USE
OF THE WORD ‘STATE’
James Alexander1,2
Abstract: This article attempts to make sense of Oakeshott’s enigmatic comment in
On Human Conduct that it was perhaps injudicious of Hegel to use the word state in the
Philosophy of Right for his conception of a bounded association. But the article does not
confine itself to making sense of Oakeshott’s meaning: it compares Oakeshott’s
conception of societas to Hegel’s conception of der Staat, Oakeshott’s conception of
philosophy as an unconditional consideration of conditional objects with Hegel’s con-
ception of philosophy as a reflexive consideration of the rationality immanent within
unconditional objects, and Oakeshott’s avoidance of divinity with Hegel’s involve-
ment in it. It is part of the purpose of this article to illustrate the suggestion that con-
ceptions of God and conceptions of the state are closely related in the thought of both
philosophers — and possibly in all philosophy: and that the problem of the state is
therefore a problem as much religious as secular.
The state has been abandoned since the nineteenth century as a necessary,
adequate or even possible subject of political philosophy. But it has not
entirely been ignored, although many political philosophers have attempted
to ignore it. The philosopher who has done most, in embattled conditions, to
generate a modern and yet properly philosophical account of the state is
Oakeshott. But even he has no theory of the state as such. In his early writings
on politics he sought such a theory. But by the time he came to write On
Human Conduct, the state — or what he called the modern European state —
was for him an ‘ambiguous association’:3 not a unity which could be explored
in terms of its supposed philosophical coherence but, rather, a disunity, some-
thing which had to be understood in terms of two separate ideal associations
before it could be subjected to philosophical consideration. It was, as he put
it in the third essay of On Human Conduct, ‘an unresolved tension between
the two irreconcilable dispositions represented by the words societas and
universitas’.4
The state has a vexed history, for it is an actual association as, say, Roman
imperium was: it is a consequence of practice rather than of philosophy. It still
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bestrides the world, or divides it up between itself, as it were. But it is also an
ideal association as, say, the Greek polis was, in that at every stage of its
development, it has been, unlike imperium — which was eulogized by poets,
enacted by jurists and explained by historians — the subject of the sort of
philosophical endeavour which means that it is conceived in terms of its ends,
which are supposed to be limited but perhaps as great as can be achieved by
mortal men in a mortal situation. The state is, above all, literally limited, or
bounded: it is not concerned with extending its boundaries, as imperium was;
nor is it concerned with opening itself to the world, as kosmopolis was. It is an
ideal — a bounded ideal; and it has obsessed clusters of men at certain points
in history whose writings have enchanted even men far less obsessed through-
out the centuries so that we still have fairly full records of the adventures in
considering entities which have been known, at one time or another, in gen-
eral terms, as polis, res publica, civitas or commonwealth and, in less general,
particular, even poetic, terms as Kallipolis, Utopia, Atlantis, Leviathan or
Oceana, to name but a few of the more famous. The state is the generic mod-
ern term for this object of philosophical adventure, but it is also the accus-
tomed name for the varieties of governmental, administrative and territorial
entities which have existed, or been supposed to exist, in Europe since any
time between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries. The term has its own
history, its own etymology,5 but this, if anything, conceals the fact that the
state is part of a more or less continuous, although not unbroken, fascination
with conceptualizing bounded associations. The novelty of the state, as
opposed to the polis or even, its derivative Roman form, res publica, is that it
emerged out of, or after, one of the longest attempts made by man to under-
stand his world, his destiny and his hopes of existing in law in terms of an
unbounded engagement with God — an engagement through faith which
made any concern with a mere city, republic or state secondary. That every
soul be subject unto the higher powers was both a spiritual and a temporal
encouragement: and the greatest basileus, imperator or papa had to acknowl-
edge this. Caesar stepped aside for God. The question was, what followed if
God was supposed to step aside for Caesar? The state, as it emerged, was not
merely an engagement with whatever Plato, Aristotle or Cicero had been con-
cerned with in antiquity: whatever classicists or humanists might innocently
think. One of the great insights of that historical modernity which has emerged
since the late eighteenth century — of which Hegel was an early and Oakeshott,
perhaps, a late example — is that nothing is sui generis, and nothing ex nihilo:
everything has a history, in terms of itself, and in terms of what is not itself —
its situation, its opposites, its struggles. The state is the shadow of the ancient
polis or res publica, indeed; but it is only so, and this must never be forgotten,
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ex post Christianitas. It carries with it, in its essence, some spiritual taint of
the aspirations of the theologians, clerics and lawyers whose conceptions
shaped the world in the eras of Constantine, Charlemagne and Charles V. It is
this — as well as, perhaps, the so-called scientific revolution and the so-called
discovery of the world — which have led to the complications of political
theory since the fifteenth century. But, of these, the religious influence is the
darkest, deepest and most intractable: it is intensive, inward, and thrusts down
into the roots of what it is possible for men to think. Hegel’s Staat and
Oakeshott’s societas are, in this sense, late variants of that general entity, the
state, particularized in so many forms since the time of Machiavelli, but con-
ceived in terms of a sensitivity to history, especially the influence of religion
in history.6
It is the endeavour of this article to say that these two men were more con-
scious of the sort of activity they were engaged in than most others who have
thought about politics — even if, in the case of Oakeshott, he considered it
necessary to say that the actual state could no longer be understood as a sim-
ple or philosophical entity in itself but as a historical tension between two
philosophical entities.7 If this were the case, he insisted, this was still some-
thing which deserved philosophical contemplation.
Although the state was said to be a tension between societas and universitas,
Oakeshott distinguished societas and universitas in order to disparage the lat-
ter; and, since the third essay of On Human Conduct was a historical essay, he
argued that the preference for societas was one which had been shared, antici-
pated and theorized by Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Of
these anticipations of societas, Bodin’s was said to be the ‘most sketchy’,
Hobbes’s ‘the most intrepid and the least equivocal’ and Hegel’s ‘the most
sophisticated’.8 Presumably because he had already written a great deal about
him, he ignored Hobbes, but he went on to demonstrate that what Bodin had
meant by république and what Hegel had meant by der Staat was what he now
meant by societas. In the six or seven pages of what remains Oakeshott’s only
adventure in understanding Hegel, he attempted to show that the meaning of
the Philosophy of Right was his own meaning.9 And at the end, after having
characterized Hegel’s ideal conception of association, he commented, almost
6 It is the intention of the author, some time in the future, to order these possibly
apparently sketchy suggestions into an entire philosophy of political history entitled
Polis, Imperium, Cosmopolis.
7 For an earlier discussion of Oakeshott’s distinctions in a different context, see
James Alexander, ‘An Essay on Historical, Philosophical and Theological Attitudes to
Modern Political Thought’, History of Political Thought, 25 (2004), pp. 126–33.
8 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p. 252.
9 For Oakeshott’s interpretation of Hegel, see ibid., pp. 256–63. There is nothing sig-
nificant about Hegel in Oakeshott’s recently published Lectures in the History of Politi-









































as an aside: ‘. . . and (perhaps injudiciously) he called such association der
Staat’.10
This aside was made in the middle of a historical essay but its significance
was not merely historical. That essay attempted to explain the character of
modern European states in terms of a highly abridged history of the interac-
tion of two conceptions of association; and insofar as it was historical, it was
the history of the imperfect manifestations of these incommensurable ideals.
Oakeshott called these ideals societas and universitas, but they were philo-
sophical ideals, the analogues of the ‘civil association’ and ‘enterprise associ-
ation’ he had delineated in the second, philosophical, essay. The discussion of
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right was, as a consequence, an exercise in philosophi-
cal reconstruction rather than an exercise in historical contextualization —
except in the sense that Oakeshott contextualized all antique, medieval and
modern political reflection by locating it within the continuities of European
history. It is perhaps necessary to add that the resolute separation of the histori-
cal and philosophical modes which Oakeshott insisted on in his early work
Experience and Its Modes was abandoned by the time he wrote On Human
Conduct. This is because he now thought that political philosophy was a ‘con-
ditional’ understanding. The structure of On Human Conduct involved a sort
of dialectic whereby Oakeshott shifted from philosophy to history: the first
essay was a philosophical study of ‘conduct’ which argued that conduct was
the ideal character of substantive action which was, as substantive action, nec-
essarily contingent and therefore ‘in principle’ subject to historical rather than
philosophical understanding.11 The shifting modality was evident in the next
two essays, where he moved from the consideration of mere (solitary) con-
duct to civility: for in the second essay he understood the civil condition
philosophically, in terms of its ideal character, but in the third essay he under-
stood it historically, in terms of the substantive and contingent events, both in
thought and deed, by which it had been manifested.
Oakeshott’s comment about Hegel’s Staat was therefore not only of histori-
cal significance but also of philosophical significance. There is no reason why
reflection on it should be confined either to Oakeshott’s meaning or to
Hegel’s meaning. There is a sense that this comment goes to the root of the
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OAKESHOTT ON HEGEL’S USE OF ‘STATE’ 151
problem of attempting to subject the state to any sort of philosophical consid-
eration. It is, in other words, not merely a scholarly matter but also a philo-
sophical matter. This is not to say that scholarship is irrelevant: but it is to say
that in the existing scholarship there has been little attempt to derive any
broader significance from it. One scholar has argued that Oakeshott’s attempt
to assimilate der Staat to societas succeeded in restating Hegel’s argument
more effectively than it had originally been stated by Hegel — an argument
for which there is something to be said (although it would require more sub-
tlety were it to be made effectively);12 while most others have argued more
plainly and plausibly that Oakeshott’s account of Hegel’s argument is only
doubtfully Hegelian but certainly Oakeshottian.13 But neither of these argu-
ments has amounted to an explanation of Oakeshott’s reason for equating his
own philosophical sketch of societas with Hegel’s philosophical sketch of the
state. And neither has dealt with the enigmatic comment about the injudi-
ciousness of using the word ‘state’. It is a comment which cannot be under-
stood in itself: it appears to be an aside, a parenthetical remark, but it is
something which cannot be understood except in terms of what Oakeshott
meant by societas, what Hegel meant by der Staat, what both Oakeshott and
Hegel meant by philosophy, and what it is possible for anyone to think about
understanding human conduct in terms of its postulates (to put it in Oakeshott’s
terms) or about achieving self-consciousness of the immanent rationality
within objective mind (to put it in Hegel’s terms). Is it, in short, possible to
have a theory of the state?
To understand Oakeshott’s comment is to understand something about why
modern political philosophy is ambivalent about the state. Oakeshott’s par-
ticular reticence about using the word state is as revealing as Hegel’s determi-
nation to use it. Whether right or wrong about Hegel, Oakeshott’s is the
subtlest expression of doubt about the state which has been made by any mod-
ern political philosopher. Other commentators have questioned the state, but
without Oakeshott’s subtlety: for where he refused to abandon philosophy,
even if it was necessary to abandon the state as a philosophically coherent
conception, others have come to consider that the state requires not philo-
sophical but historical or sociological attention.14 Yet unless modern political
philosophy is to dismiss the problem of the state altogether, it is necessary to
12 See Paul Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (New Haven,
1990), pp. 207–10.
13 See Efraim Podoksik, In Defence of Modernity: Vision and Philosophy in Michael
Oakeshott (Exeter, 2003), p. 189; and Luke O’Sullivan, Oakeshott on History (Exeter,
2003), pp. 210–13.
14 See, for instance, Philip Abrams, ‘Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State
(1977)’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 1 (1988), pp. 58–89; Michel Foucault,
‘Governmentality’, in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham
Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (London, 1991), pp. 87–104; Timothy Mitchell,









































accept that either it, or the conceptual elements which together compose it,
can be subjected to proper philosophical study. Hegel and Oakeshott are two
of the greatest political philosophers in our tradition because they saw the
necessity of preventing political philosophy from ending in an acknowledge-
ment of the entire irrelevance of philosophy for politics.
Oakeshott’s criticism could not be ignored even if it did justice to neither
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right nor the state, because it does do justice to politi-
cal philosophy. Three questions will be asked here: first, why Oakeshott con-
sidered it injudicious of Hegel to use the word state; second, whether he fully
understood Hegel in saying so; and, third, what the significance of such silent
misunderstanding or possibly deliberate partial understanding was for both
Oakeshott’s and Hegel’s conceptions of the state. It should come as no sur-
prise to anyone familiar with the works of Hegel or Oakeshott that the signifi-
cance is not simply a matter of politics but also a matter of religion. For, where
Oakeshott attempted to distinguish philosophy from theology, Hegel did not
(or did so dialectically in a manner which preserved in philosophy what he
thought was the real content of theology): and it is only in considering Hegel’s
willingness — perhaps too great a willingness — to confront both Gott and
Staat in his political philosophy and Oakeshott’s reluctance — perhaps too
great a reluctance — to dismiss both mere gods and mere states in his which
will allow us to understand the importance for modern political philosophy of
the injudiciousness or otherwise of using the word state. The subject here is
secularity: and how far political philosophy can be meaningful if founded only
in secular and not in theological, or even secularized theological, certainties.
If this were a simple article it might simply venture an exposition of
Oakeshott’s meaning, or, further, attempt to demonstrate that Oakeshott did
not do justice to Hegel. But this would be superficial. This article is deliber-
ately not simple because the initial question is not whether or not Oakeshott
understood Hegel correctly but how he understood him; and the eventual
question is not whether On Human Conduct or the Philosophy of Right had a
better interpretation of the conception of the state but what follows from an
attempt to understand the differences between them. Hegel and Oakeshott
were both concerned with political philosophy; and the purpose of the article
is to contribute to a better understanding of not merely Hegel or Oakeshott but
political philosophy itself.
So the article is structured as follows. The first part considers how Oakeshott
interpreted Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in order to suggest that der Staat was
an anticipation of his own societas. Oakeshott’s and Hegel’s philosophies had
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zens (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 28–38. For the confusions involved in any contemporary
attempt to theorize the state see Raymond Geuss, ‘The State’, in History and Illusion in
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a certain amount in common; but it was the difference between them which
means that societas cannot be considered more than an abridgement, reduction
or minimization of der Staat. The second part of the article makes the differ-
ence between societas and der Staat clear by showing how the entire philo-
sophical understanding Oakeshott developed in On Human Conduct differed
from the entire philosophical understanding Hegel had developed in the Phi-
losophy of Right. The third part goes on to consider those elements which are
abandoned, ignored or obscured if der Staat is taken to be no more and no less
than societas — the elements which Oakeshott ignored and Hegel did not —
namely, the religious elements. In other words, we will consider first der Staat
as societas, then der Staat in and for itself, and finally der Staat and societas
as varieties of what we might call — after Hobbes or Schmitt — some sort of
mortalis deus. We will shift, then, from the limitations of Oakeshott’s under-
standing of the state to the limitations of Hegel’s understanding, and then onto
the limitations of an understanding which is not so much a separate under-
standing of the state as much as a characterization of what possibly lies behind
any attempt to understand the state either as an unconditional object or as a
conditional and contingent combination of conditional ideal objects.
I
Oakeshott wrote nothing decisive about the philosophy of the state until he
put forward in On Human Conduct his conviction that the state was not an
unconditional object in itself but an unresolved tension between two condi-
tional conceptions of association, societas and universitas. The incorporation
of Hegel’s Staat into societas may not have been one of Oakeshott’s greatest
achievements. In terms of the entirety of On Human Conduct it was not of
much importance. But, for Oakeshott, it was the resolution of a difficulty he
had encountered first in the twenties, sidestepped in the thirties and forties,
and not seen his way to resolving until the seventies. This difficulty was the
difficulty of knowing what could be said about the state — and, for Oakeshott,
the state was never the mere state of history but the philosophical state of the
idealists and especially Hegel. The six or seven pages in On Human Conduct
were a belated tribute to an overwhelming influence, a determined recovery
after years of an apparent reluctance to say anything about the state in philo-
sophical terms, and a triumphant reorientation in which the obscurities of
Hegel’s understanding were finally resolved.
Oakeshott first attempted to deal with the problem of the state in the twen-
ties as if a theory of the state were possible.15 In the only essay he wrote on that
subject his view of the state was heightened and rather severe: he argued that
15 This paragraph is indebted to Gerencser’s observation about the importance of the
early essay ‘The Authority of the State’ as an idealist statement from which Oakeshott
receded. See Steven Anthony Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott (New York, 2000),









































most understandings of the state were ‘abstract’ or ‘ideal’ and therefore insuf-
ficient. The state had to be understood as something which was not partial,
abstract or ideal, but a unity. It was a ‘complete conception’ and a ‘fact’: but a
‘fact’ only when it was understood as complete in itself, and a ‘complete con-
ception’ only when it was seen to supersede all other partial conceptions of it
so they were seen ‘neither as possible alternative, nor as contradictions, nor as
contributions, but as abstractions to be supplanted’. The state was, in this
sense, a ‘truth’ not an ‘abstraction’, something ‘self-subsistent’, something
‘which carries with it the explanation of itself’: it was a unity which would not
need to be related to any other greater unity in order to be understood and it
was, in fully Hegelian manner, ‘the totality in an actual community which
satisfies the whole mind of the individuals who compose it’. Oakeshott him-
self had difficulties with the height of this conception — ‘I cannot now enter
into all the implications of this conception of the state, and indeed I do not pre-
tend that they are all as clear to me as I should wish’ — but he dealt with the
problem of saying where such a state might exist by remarking that ‘the state
exists insofar as such a satisfaction exists, and wherever that satisfaction is
found, there is the state’.16
This recasting of Hegel’s obscurities evidently did not convince Oakeshott
in the twenties, and it seems that conviction was lacking until the publication
of On Human Conduct fifty years later. That there was a problem about the
idealist conception of the state can be seen from his silence about Hegel; that
the problem was resolved can be seen from the end of that silence. Oakeshott
had always admired Hegel. In the thirties he mentioned Hegel and Plato as
exemplary philosophers,17 in the forties Plato, Hobbes and Hegel as exem-
plary political philosophers,18 and in the seventies, as we have already seen,
Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Hegel as exemplary political phi-
losophers of societas.19 Whenever he alluded to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,
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continuity, Gerencser observes, as it seems, rightly, that all of Oakeshott’s writing from
Experience and Its Modes onwards are signs of philosophical reorientation. See,
Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott, pp. 61, 63 and 65. For Franco’s strongest statement
of his conviction that On Human Conduct was intended to be, and was, a modern restate-
ment of the Philosophy of Right, see Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael
Oakeshott, pp. 209–10.
16 Oakeshott, ‘The Authority of the State’ (1929), in Religion, Politics and the Moral
Life, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven, 1993), pp. 80–4.
17 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge, 1933), p. 7.
18 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Introduction’, in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter,
Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, ed. Michael Oakeshott
(Oxford, 1946), p. xii; or Michael Oakeshott, ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, in Rationalism
in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis, 1991), pp. 227–8. In this article references to
both editions will be given.
19 He also paid tribute in On Human Conduct to Aristotle, along with Hobbes and
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it was in heightened terms — as, for instance, a ‘grand and subtle creation’.20
But there was a problem about Hegel, as there was not, for instance, about
Hobbes.21 It has been argued by at least one scholar that the failure to under-
stand politics philosophically became obvious to Oakeshott at some point
between the late twenties and late thirties but was a failure he recovered from
after the late thirties by abandoning the heightened or total claims of absolute
idealism and by turning instead to the rather more sceptical, intrepid and yet
minimal idealism he developed through an encounter with Hobbes.22 If this is
the case, as it may be, then it would explain why Oakeshott could not have
written anything effective about Hegel before the reorientation begun in the
thirties was theorized in philosophical terms — something which did not hap-
pen until he wrote On Human Conduct. And since Oakeshott’s thought had
emerged as a recession from absolute idealism, it is possible that when he
finally managed to generate his own philosophical approach to the state he
needed to demonstrate that even Hegel’s Staat was something which could be
interpreted not merely in a heightened sense — as it was usually under-
stood — but also in this sceptical, intrepid and minimal sense.23
Whatever the case, it is evident that there was no reinterpretation of Hegel’s
Staat in Oakeshott’s writings until the late sixties and early seventies. In a
review of an edition of Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right written
a few years before the publication of On Human Conduct, Oakeshott was dis-
missive about Marx, who ‘belonged to a generation of unfortunates who
could not think about anything without engaging in the often tedious business
of explaining exactly how their thoughts related to what they took Hegel to
have said’. Oakeshott thought that while Hegel had been ‘a masterful original
thinker’ — in other words, a philosopher — his followers had sought to make
his philosophy into a matter of belief and salvation. Marx was merely one of
many who ‘cast his thoughts into the form of a critique of Hegel’; although, as
Montesquieu, Von Humboldt and Constant, for characterizing the association he called
societas. See Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, pp. 109, 181 and 245–6. Oakeshott’s hall
of fame was sometimes erratic. See below, footnote 27.
20 Oakeshott, ‘Introduction’, p. xv or p. 231.
21 Oakeshott wrote a great deal about Hobbes from the thirties onwards. He reflected
on the new literature on Hobbes written between 1925 and 1934 in ‘Thomas Hobbes’,
Scrutiny, 4 (1935–6), pp. 263–77; then about what he considered to be the best exposition
of Hobbes in ‘Leo Strauss on Hobbes’, Politica, 2 (1936–7), pp. 364–79; then he contrib-
uted his own understanding in his ‘Introduction’ to Leviathan (1946) and the further
essay ‘The Moral Life in the Writing of Thomas Hobbes’ (1960), which were collected in
Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Oxford, 1975).
22 See Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott, pp. 108 and126.
23 The question of Oakeshott’s relation to Hegel is discussed in Wendell John Coats,
‘Oakeshott and Hegel’, in his Oakeshott and His Contemporaries: Montaigne, St Augus-
tine, Hegel et al (Selinsgrove, 2000), pp. 39–51, and Paul Franco, ‘Oakeshott’s Relation-
ship to Hegel’, in The Intellectual Legacy of Michael Oakeshott, ed. Timothy Fuller and









































it happened, the critique was ‘an odd performance’, and, so far as Hegel was
concerned, ‘totally worthless’. Marx was said by Oakeshott to have misunder-
stood Hegel particularly on the subject of the state.
Instead of understanding Hegel to be asking the question, What is the char-
acter of a society of rational free agents — persons in respect of being
wills?, that is, What is the idea State?, Marx understands him to be offering
a demonstration of how the Absolute Idea (regarded as a kind of cosmic
demiurge) creates the empirical actualities of political sentiments and rela-
tionships. He turns Hegel’s speculative philosophy into the vulgarest kind
of Platonism to be disposed of by the Feuerbachian formula. And he mis-
takes Hegel’s not always felicitous attempt to find the quantum of rational-
ity in some of the well-known institutions of European law and government
for an attempt to deduce some of the more antiquated of these institutions
from the Absolute Idea and thus to justify them. In short, Marx fathers upon
Hegel everything Hegel himself expressly disclaimed.24
Oakeshott wanted to preserve Hegel from any vulgar interpretation of his phi-
losophy and so suggested on the one hand that the state was an ideal and on the
other that philosophy was the attempt to locate the ‘quantum of rationality’ in
the modern European politics — the quantum, note — with everything else
presumably a consequence of Hegel’s ‘not always felicitous attempt’ to do so.
In a review of Avineri’s book, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, pub-
lished a few years later, Oakeshott went further. He distinguished Avineri’s
achievement in making sense of the ‘miscellaneous, fragmentary and often
obscure’ materials which displayed Hegel’s continuous engagement with
politics from his failure to explain what the Philosophy of Right was really
about. Oakeshott maintained that it was possible to use Hegel’s observations,
comments and views on contemporary political matters to explain much of
the Philosophy of Right, because it was a ‘dreadfully miscellaneous piece of
writing’ which made ‘considerable excursions into matters of contingency’.
But he considered that it was not possible to understand Hegel’s attempt to
explain the state in philosophical terms as if it were merely the culmination of
his reflections on contemporary politics. Avineri’s book left the ‘deep obscuri-
ties’ — philosophical obscurities — of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right untouched.
It could not explain, for instance, what Hegel had meant by der Geist, das
Subjekt, der Wille, das Recht and das Gesetz. And it could not explain what
Oakeshott repeatedly referred to as the ‘notional’ or ‘ideal’ association which
Hegel ‘call[ed] der Staat’. Oakeshott was extremely cautious. What Hegel
had meant by the state was not ‘the current German conception of a state’; nor
was it the modern European conception of a state. It was an ideal: it was a
philosophical attempt to sketch an ideal. He did not say in this review that it
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24 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Michael Oakeshott on Marx on Hegel’, a review of Karl
Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge, 1970),









































OAKESHOTT ON HEGEL’S USE OF ‘STATE’ 157
had perhaps been injudicious of Hegel to use the word state for such an ideal;
but he emphasized that it was the word Hegel had chosen for his ideal with
such emphasis that it is evident when this review is read in relation to what he
wrote in On Human Conduct that he wanted to suggest that Hegel need not
have used it.25
In the third essay of On Human Conduct Oakeshott left Hegel’s own con-
ceptions — of der Geist, der Wille, das Gesetz, das Recht and der Staat — in
the original German, but explained them in terms of his own characteristic
conceptions. It would be possible, although it will not be attempted here, to
indicate exactly how each of Hegel’s conceptions was interpreted in such a
way as to encourage the sense that Hegel had meant in the Philosophy of Right
what Oakeshott meant in On Human Conduct. It is enough to say that
Oakeshott’s explanation was relentless, thorough and subtle — more than
that, it was plausible. But it was simpler than it seemed: for each part of the
interpretation was there simply to support the fundamental equation which
Oakeshott insisted existed between societas and der Staat.
Oakeshott’s entire criticism of Hegel was framed in such a way as to make
such an equation inevitable.26 Hegel was the last and the greatest of those who
‘were alike in their recognition of a state in the terms of societas’. This meant
he was the inheritor, as Oakeshott considered himself to be, of the tradition
which emphasized the ‘sentiment of individuality’: which saw life as an
adventure carried out by a subject in a world of uncertainty (contingency)
rather than an end achieved by a substance in a world of certainty (teleology).
It was ‘the strongest strand in the moral convictions of the inhabitants of mod-
ern Europe’; it was the ideal of ‘civitas peregrina: an association, not of pil-
grims travelling to a common destination, but of adventurers each responding
as best he [could] to the ordeal of consciousness in a world composed of oth-
ers of his kind’; and it was found not only in Bodin, Hobbes, Hegel and the rest,
but also found in every element of the Christian, Stoic, Epicurean and Roman
Law traditions Oakeshott could bring himself to admire and in everyone from
St Francis, Ockham, Abelard and Cervantes — through Machiavelli, Con-
stant and Montesquieu — to Burke, Paine, Salisbury and Acton.27
Oakeshott took Hegel to have been a ‘resilient European who recognized
what was afoot as a modernity to be responded to’.
25 Michael Oakeshott, Review of Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern
State (Cambridge, 1973), in European Studies Review (1975), pp. 217–20.
26 Oakeshott’s interpretation of Hegel’s meaning constituted the last part of the long
section in the third essay of On Human Conduct which dealt with the varieties of histori-
cal understanding of the state as an ‘enterprise association’ or societas. For this, see pp.
233–63.
27 See Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, pp. 235–51, and especially pp. 239, 242 and
243. For Maurice Cowling’s comment on this ‘eclectic pedigree’ see M. Cowling, Reli-









































He thought he discerned in the French Revolution and in the Napoleonic
shake-up of Europe the emergence of human associations in many respects
unlike (and superior to) anything to be found in the earlier history of Euro-
pean relationships, and he calls these associations ‘states’, meaning ‘states
in the proper sense’.28
But even though Hegel had responded to a particular historical experience, he
had done so as a philosopher ‘determined to understand everything in terms of
its postulates and engaged in a tireless exploration of the conditions of condi-
tions which nevertheless recognised the conditional autonomy of whatever
revealed itself to be conditional’.29 Oakeshott’s interpretation of Hegel’s philo-
sophical consideration of der Staat was therefore minimal and restrained: in
translating Hegel’s German into English it assimilated it into a philosophical
perspective which emphasized the conditionality of understanding. Accord-
ing to Oakeshott, Hegel began with human beings conceived as ‘individual
exhibitions of der Geist’. Der Geist was not ‘a substance or impersonal force
loose in the universe’ but, instead, the ‘reflective intelligence’ which existed
in ‘the characters, the adventures, the works, and the relations of human
beings’. Oakeshott emphasized the individuality of those possessing this
intelligence.
In respect of being an exhibition of der Geist each man is self-moved by his
own self-understanding and what he is generically (Geist) is the specifica-
tion of his individuality. He is in himself what he is for himself. Geist is
Subjekt, not Substanz. Thus, although such human beings may, perhaps, be
said to have a common engagement which may be recognised as participa-
tion in the continuous self-enactment of der Wirkinde Geist (an adventure,
not a teleological process), they have no common substantive purpose; they
are an irreducible plurality of Subjekte.30
With this established, such subjects could only be associated in terms of
‘learned and understood conditions of association’. Oakeshott went on to
show how humans were not only exhibitions of der Geist but also der Wille:
not abstract reflective intelligence but an ‘engagement’ of that intelligence
with the world. Against mere objects, the subject had ‘the unconditional right
of Geist over Nature (not-Geist)’ but against other subjects, the subject had no
unconditional right. The subject in possession of der Wille amongst other sub-
jects was capable of right and wrong; and this necessitated, as a condition of
association, das Recht, or what Oakeshott called ‘considerations of right con-
duct’. Oakeshott located the sophistication of Hegel’s account of this in terms
of the importance of each subject’s acknowledgement of das Recht.
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The only conditions of conduct which do not compromise the inherent
integrity of a Subject are those which reach him in his understanding of
them, which he is free to subscribe to or not, and which can be subscribed to
only in an intelligent act of Will. The necessary characteristic of das Recht
is not that the Subject must himself have chosen or approved what it
requires him to subscribe to, but that it comes to him as the product of
reflective intelligence and exhibiting its title to recognition, and that it
enjoins not a substantive action but the acknowledgement of a condition
which can be satisfied only in a self-chosen action.31
Das Recht could be manifested in many forms, one of which was ‘that in
which persons are related to one another in continuous transactions to procure
the satisfaction of their wants’; but Hegel emphasized the ‘moral’ association
in which ‘the associates [were] not merely instruments of one another’s satis-
factions’. This was der Staat: ‘a system of known, positive, self-authenticating,
non-instrumental rules of law’ or Gesetze. To be associated in terms of das
Gesetz was ‘to be related in terms of conditions which [could] be observed
only in being understood’. And it was in this acceptance and understanding of
das Gesetz that das Recht was acknowledged and der Staat achieved. Oakeshott
summarized his understanding thus:
In the Philosophie des Rechts, then, Hegel was concerned to characterize
the ideal mode of association postulated in persons understood in the condi-
tional terms of der Wille. He concluded that it is a relationship in terms of
das Gesetz and (perhaps injudiciously) he called such association der
Staat.32
This was the essence of Oakeshott’s understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of
the state: an association of free individualities through their own conscious
acceptance of conditions laid down in law such that the association itself had
no further end of its own: one which existed solely in order to formally, or
morally, relate individuals. It was an ideal association, this state, minimal and
abstract: and, according to Oakeshott, it was indistinguishable from his own
conception of societas.
Oakeshott’s criticism of Hegel was that he had written as if der Staat was
not merely an ideal but an actuality. Hegel’s attempts to relate his ideal to
‘certain of the legal and governmental institutions of modern Europe’ had
been ‘often far-fetched’, although he had not been wrong to suggest that der
Staat had been intimated in some of the experience of ‘the so-called political
associations of European peoples: in the ancient Greek polis, in the medieval
realm, and particularly in modern European states’. Nonetheless Oakeshott
doubted Hegel’s conviction that ‘the states of modern Europe were on their
way to acquiring the character of der Staat’ and commented that ‘no modern
31 Ibid., p. 260.









































European state could be identified as an unambiguous example of the idea
Staat’.33
Oakeshott’s meaning, then, was straightforward. If no modern European
state could be identified as an unambiguous example of the idea Staat then it
had been injudicious of Hegel to use the very word which made it possible for
less careful philosophers to confuse the idea Staat with any particular actual
state. But it is important to recognize that this was not the only reason,
although it was the most overt. For by distinguishing two philosophical con-
ceptions by which he supposed the merely contingent state was to be ideally
understood, Oakeshott was declaring that the state itself was not something
which could be considered an unconditional philosophical conception — nor,
for that matter, was it an unconditional actuality. Although Oakeshott did not
say this, it lay behind his comment that it was injudicious to call the associa-
tion der Staat. It was evident in every translation of Hegel’s terminology he
effected, but especially the one that he effected when he translated der Staat in
the third essay of On Human Conduct as societas.
II
Some commentators admired Oakeshott’s explication of Hegel; others called
it a misrepresentation. Riley wrote, soon after Oakeshott’s death, that ‘the half-
dozen pages on the Philosophy of Right eclipse many full-length treatises’.34
But Pitkin wrote, soon after the publication of On Human Conduct, that the
same pages displayed ‘an account marred by distortions so obvious and of
such a kind that they seem understandable only as a denial or rejection of the
dialectic in Hegel’s thought’.35 Neither noticed that it was not Oakeshott’s
purpose to render all of Hegel’s philosophy, but only that part of it which
could be rearranged within his own philosophy.
So far, this article has suggested that Oakeshott thought it was injudicious
of Hegel to have called his ideal association der Staat because in doing so he
blurred the distinction between the ideal and the actual; and in so doing
allowed later writers such as Marx to assume that Hegel’s Staat was an actual
institution. This was, in a sense, an unexceptional criticism: indeed, a Hegelian
one: it criticized Hegel for not being Hegelian enough. But it is one which is
likely to mislead us if we consider it apart from what distinguished Oakeshott
from Hegel, which was the fact that the former saw the state as something
conditional while the latter saw it as something unconditional. Der Staat was
an actual unity — the state itself; whereas societas was a conception which
when related to the rival conception of universitas made sense of the state. It is
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35 Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, ‘Inhuman Conduct and Unpolitical Theory: Michael









































OAKESHOTT ON HEGEL’S USE OF ‘STATE’ 161
necessary to emphasize that the difference between these two views of the
state was the consequence of two different but related conceptions of philoso-
phy. Even though Oakeshott’s comment was made midway through the third
essay of On Human Conduct, it was not a mere aside: it was a comment con-
sistent with the entirety of his argument. The book of course took the form of
three related essays: the first on the understanding of human conduct, the sec-
ond on the ideal association which he called the ‘civil condition’ or civitas,
and the third on the unresolved tension between societas and universitas
which he supposed could be used to explain the history of the modern Euro-
pean state. But the book was, nonetheless, an attempt to sketch an entire phi-
losophy — an attempt to do justice to its own argument.36 The purpose of the
six or seven pages on Hegel was certainly not to do justice to Hegel’s argu-
ment in its entirety.37 Nor was it to do justice to der Staat. The purpose was to
do justice to the conception of societas, to demonstrate that it was a concep-
tion which had been anticipated in the writings of earlier philosophers, and to
ignore, dismiss or criticize any inconvenient elements of those writings. So
when Oakeshott took der Staat as his ostensible object he was interpreting it
not in terms of Hegel’s philosophy but in terms of his own. And Hegel’s con-
ception of der Staat was no longer Hegel’s Staat once it was justified in terms
of Oakeshott’s philosophical conceptions.
The reason the six or seven pages by Oakeshott about Hegel in On Human
Conduct cannot be understood without an entire sense of the Philosophy of
Right (and not simply the section on der Staat) or without an entire sense of
On Human Conduct (and not simply the section on societas) is because both
Oakeshott and Hegel understood politics, right or association — the particular
name does not matter — within the frame of philosophy. They were con-
cerned to establish understandings of the objects subjected to understanding,
to establish an understanding of that understanding itself, and to relate the
objects understood to the understanding understood. Both had a heightened
sense of what it was to be a philosopher and, consequently, both acknowl-
edged — although to different extents — the circularity of the enterprise they
were engaged in. The difference between them was that Oakeshott’s circular-
ity was clear in the parallels which existed between the philosophical activity
36 As Oakeshott urged against Pitkin. See Oakeshott, ‘On Misunderstanding Human
Conduct: A Reply to My Critics’, Political Theory, 4 (1976), p. 353.
37 Oakeshott himself acknowledged this: ‘What I have to say is no more than a brief
account of his thoughts on this theme [of the philosophy of human association], omitting
much that falls within the folds of his reflection, rearranging the argument, and taking
short cuts with some of its transitional passages.’ Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p. 257.
He was too modest: he did not say that he was deliberately interpreting the meaning of the









































by which the state would be considered and the idea of societas to which his
philosophical activity tended — it was analogical; whereas Hegel’s circular-
ity was in the absolute identity between the philosophical activity which
realized the state and the idea of the state to which philosophical activity
tended — it was teleological. This is why Pitkin said Oakeshott misunder-
stood Hegel: because Hegel was dialectical, and Oakeshott undialectical.38 To
use words they both used, Oakeshott’s circularity was formal without being
substantial while Hegel’s was formal and substantial.
Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy, by the time he came to write On
Human Conduct, was of an ‘engagement of understanding’ which was ‘un-
conditional’. It began with something understood, a ‘fact’, and subjected this
to a critical engagement on the grounds that ‘every understanding is recog-
nised as a not-yet-understood and therefore as an invitation to understand’. It
was an endless engagement in the sense that it was concerned with the adven-
ture of understanding and not the supposed end to be reached by an under-
standing. And so ‘the notion of an unconditional or definitive understanding’
had no part in the adventure: all that was unconditional was the engagement to
understand: any understanding was itself taken to be ‘conditional’.39 This
doctrine, expressed in the first essay of On Human Conduct, had obvious con-
sequences for his view of the state in the later essays: only the engagement to
understand was unconditional — everything else, even the state, and certainly
any understanding of the state, was conditional.
In the twenties he had taken the state to be a ‘fact’ which was above and
beyond any abstract conception of it; but in On Human Conduct the implica-
tion was that insofar as the state was a ‘fact’ it was, as such, no more than the
‘contingent starting-point of a critical enquiry’.40 An object when identified
was not ‘a verdict to be accepted’ but ‘an invitation to interrogate it’.41 And to
subject an object to philosophical consideration was to understand it as an
‘abstracted identity in terms of its conditions’. Oakeshott called this an under-
standing ‘poised between heaven and earth’.42 He was, like Daedalus, wary of
both heaven and earth but especially, in this regard, heaven. He dismissed the
attempt to discover ‘an unconditional understanding’ of anything: any end,
telos or unconditional understanding was, he thought, a sign of a ‘visionary’
temperament which was out of place in his conception of philosophy.43
Oakeshott avoided teleology, but he did not avoid circularity, although he
did not draw attention to it. The circularity consisted in the fact that in On
Human Conduct both the unconditional engagement of philosophy and the
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OAKESHOTT ON HEGEL’S USE OF ‘STATE’ 163
ideal association generated by the conditional engagement derived from it were
understood in terms of adventure. At the very beginning of the book, philoso-
phy, or the engagement of understanding, was said to be an ‘adventure’ and
not the ‘end’ sought by that understanding, while at the very end of the
book societas was associated with the disposition to seek ‘adventure’ and
universitas with the disposition to seek ‘ends’.44 Neither the engagement of
understanding, nor the engagement of enacting oneself, nor even the engage-
ment of being associated in terms of a recognition of a shared civil condi-
tion — none of these was to do with ends. They were all adventures. There
was no ‘substantive’ purpose to either Oakeshott’s philosophy or his ideal
association.45 Thus, although in retreat from absolute idealism, Oakeshott’s
philosophy was fully circular. Philosophy was in harness with societas. The
circularity was the circularity of adventure: but nothing was unconditional in
political philosophy but philosophy itself. Neither the state nor Hegel’s
Staat — and not even his own societas — was unconditional.
Oakeshott’s dialectic was, by comparison with Hegel’s, like his conception
of societas — abstract, ideal and minimal. It is likely that Oakeshott agreed
with much of what was in Hegel but expressed himself far less emphatically,
because far more modern: more sceptical, that is, more emphatic that meta-
phor was metaphor. Hegel could declare that the ‘content’ of philosophy was
‘essentially inseparable from the form’.46 Oakeshott, who may well have
agreed with him, was far more reticent about any circularity in his system; for
he emphasized far more the open, endless nature of proper philosophical
understanding. This is the root of the structural difference between the two
philosophical systems: it explains why Oakeshott, who structured his argu-
ment in twofold divisions, tended towards separation, while Hegel, who
structured his argument in threefold divisions, tended towards reconciliation.
Oakeshott’s was, formally at least, an open system; Hegel’s was, formally at
least, a closed one.
Whenever Oakeshott approached a problem he distinguished two possibili-
ties — sometimes as conditional and unconditional, sometimes as logos and
telos, sometimes as adventure and end — and emphasized the superiority of
adventure, logos or the conditional over the end, telos or the unconditional.
When he came to consider the ‘common good’ he was insistent that ‘the teleo-
logical suggestion it contain[ed]’ had to be abandoned. For the common
good, when correctly understood, was not a ‘substantive satisfaction’ but the
44 Ibid., pp. vii and 324.
45 Ibid., p. 119. This is why, amongst many others, Josiah Lee Auspitz called his phi-
losophy ‘empty, formal, negative and ambitious’, in J.L. Auspitz, ‘Individuality, Civility
and Theory: The Philosophical Imagination of Michael Oakeshott’, Political Theory, 4
(1976), p. 264.
46 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cam-
bridge, 1991), preface, p. 10. References other than to the preface will be given by sec-









































achievement of ‘a practice without any extrinsic purpose’.47 When he came to
consider the difference between ‘self-disclosure’ and ‘self-enactment’ it was
the same: the latter was admired more because it was not orientated towards
the achievement of ends and therefore was not ‘liable to frustration, disap-
pointment and defeat’.48 And when he came to deal with history he insisted on
the conditional nature of the stories which made up history and dismissed any
unconditional story as ‘myth’.49 On each occasion Oakeshott divided the
object he subjected to understanding into two possibilities in order to dismiss
one. What he dismissed was always what he supposed was the mythical
unconditionality. So when he divided the state into societas and universitas he
dismissed the latter because it anticipated an unconditional end.
Hegel’s philosophy was not a matter of division and dismissal. He warred
against two mistakes: one was the mistake which led philosophers to take ref-
uge in abstract concepts; the other was the mistake which led them to become
distracted by the merely contingent matters of actuality, particularity or, as we
might call it, history. He too was wary of both heaven and earth; but he did not
want to remain poised between them: he wanted to reconcile them. He did not,
as Oakeshott did, divide the world into two: one of eternity (philosophy) and
one of contingency (history), and then engage in an extremely sophisticated
tying of small threads between them which did not conceal the problem of a
fundamental divide. On the contrary, Hegel suggested not a twofold ordering
of the world, always ending in division, but a threefold ordering, according to
which abstract concepts — considered to be the first moment in thought —
and the particularities encountered in experience — considered to be the sec-
ond moment — were reconciled in a third moment. Sometimes he spoke of
this as a progression; but at other times he called it a circularity. It was this cir-
cularity which constituted philosophy for Hegel: it was only when essences
had existence that there was the ‘complete interpenetration’ of the abstract
and the concrete which constituted what he called the idea. And thus, for him,
philosophy ‘form[ed] a circle’.50 Since his philosophy was substantial and not
merely formal it was no limitation to admit that it was a circular structure:
whereas Oakeshott could only have explicitly admitted that his philosophy
was circular at the cost of admitting that it was not open. And this he never
did.
For Hegel, there was nothing in philosophy which could only be under-
stood in terms of an opposite which was analysed separately: any opposite,
any negative, was a mere moment opposed to a positive and therefore consti-
tuted part of the movement of that positive in the world. Hegel did not divide
the world in two and dismiss half of it. Oppositions, he declared, when ‘they
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[were] not abstract determinations like positive and negative’ in fact ‘pass[ed]
over into one another’.51 To consider something rationally was ‘not to bring
reason to bear on the object from outside’ because reason had to recognize
that ‘the object is itself rational for itself’. Hegel did not admire the sort of rea-
soning which ‘takes an object, proposition, etc. given to feeling or to the
immediate consciousness in general, and dissolves it, confuses it, develops it
this way and that, and is solely concerned with deducing its opposite — a
negative mode which frequently appears even in Plato’.52 Philosophy was not
about the opposition of ideas, or the abstraction of them: but about their mani-
festation, establishment or existence.
It was the threefold structure which enabled Hegel to achieve the reflex-
ivity whereby the unity of separate moments was continually achieved, as
‘particularity [was] reflected back into itself and thereby restored to univer-
sality’. He was aware of the difficulty of formally justifying his philosophical
structure, and his writings and lectures are testimony to the fact that he dem-
onstrated it by use rather than from first principles — even in his Logic. (This
is why Marx remarked, according to what Oakeshott would have called the
Feuerbachian formula: ‘Logic is not used to prove the nature of the state, but
the state is used to prove the logic.’)53 Hegel anticipated that other philoso-
phers would find the first moment of abstract concepts easy to comprehend,
and that even those who were not philosophers would be able to comprehend
the second moment of determinacy and particularity because it corresponded
to the usual world of experience. But he also saw that the ‘third moment’ was
the hardest to comprehend, even for philosophers, because it relied on some-
thing akin to a leap of faith. Understanding, he declared, usually opposed any
attempt to reconcile abstract concepts with concrete understanding and found
such a reconciliation ‘incomprehensible’.54 Yet it was the highest task of phi-
losophy to make such a reconciliation comprehensible.
In the Philosophy of Right Hegel was critical of philosophy which depended
on mere abstractions. The danger of even unenacted abstract thought was that
it ‘dissolved’ everything, leaving reality in a state of ‘pure indeterminacy’.55
Abstract ideals, if they remained abstract, were empty. The following — even
if it is likely that Oakeshott would formally have agreed with it — can still be
51 Ibid., 26, p. 56.
52 Ibid., 31, p. 60.
53 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. Joseph O’Malley (Cam-
bridge, 1970), p. 18. This is an instance of the arresting nature of the one-sided criticisms
Marx made of Hegel; and to which Oakeshott did not perhaps do justice. What Oakeshott
did not adequately acknowledge in his review of the Critique was that although an accep-
tance of Marx’s critique was misleading about Hegel, an understanding of it certainly
was not.
54 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 7, p. 41.









































considered a criticism of the conceptions Oakeshott’s philosophy culminated
in:
Since philosophy is exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the
comprehension of the present and the actual, not the setting up of a world
beyond which exists God knows where — or, rather of which we can very
well say that we know where it exists, namely in the errors of a one-sided
and empty ratiocination.56
Hegel was particularly contemptuous of philosophy which found rationality
only in understanding. This was to display the world as if it were ‘at the mercy
of contingency and arbitrariness’: to suggest that ‘truth’ lay outside the world,
that the world was ‘god-forsaken’. He convicted others, and might well have
convicted Oakeshott, of putting forward an ‘atheism of the ethical world’.57
It would be wrong to exaggerate this: Oakeshott could in some respects eas-
ily be seen as an almost perfect Hegelian. It is not that Hegel simply consid-
ered there was a duty to consider the rational within the present and actual (as
in the famous claim that ‘What is rational is actual; and what is actual is
rational’); and it is not that Oakeshott simply considered there was a duty to
distinguish the rational, or what he called the ideal, from the present and
actual. All philosophy depends on distinction, categorization and
generalization. But Oakeshott’s philosophy in On Human Conduct originated
and culminated in separation; whereas Hegel’s in the Philosophy of Right
originated and culminated in reconciliation. The question is what this tells us
about the distinctive nature of Oakeshott’s eventual philosophical views and
the effect they had not only on the status of der Staat but also on the status of
societas.
While Hegel accepted that certain objects were, to use Oakeshott’s term,
unconditional insofar as they possessed an immanent rationality of which
philosophy was simply the coming-into-consciousness (the state existed);
Oakeshott accepted no objects as unconditional (the state did not exist). It is
likely that Oakeshott, writing at a later time than Hegel, considered that con-
tingency had leached further through the bows of philosophy. It was still
afloat, as far as he was concerned, but not as before. Societas was the ship of
state only as a ghost ship; while der Staat was recalled as if it were the Mary
Celeste, without obvious destination or crew. This is why his own ideal of the
‘civil condition’, which he called civitas in the second, historical, essay of On
Human Conduct and societas in the third, philosophical, essay, was a ‘formal,
not substantial’ association between men: ‘that is, association in respect of a
common language and not in respect of having the same beliefs, purposes,
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OAKESHOTT ON HEGEL’S USE OF ‘STATE’ 167
interests, etc., or in making the same utterances’.58 It was an adventure, not an
end: a minimal, formal, legal construction.
It is clear that Oakeshott’s exposition of what he supposed the meaning of
the Philosophy of Right to be was part of his philosophical exposition of his
own ideas. He was using his own philosophy to explore the intimations of ear-
lier thought just as, at the same time, he was using earlier thought to demon-
strate that his philosophical theory of association was not a mere modern
oddity but was something which took its place as part of a continuous series of
attempts on the part of philosophers since at least the middle of the sixteenth
century to make sense of politics in terms of human conduct. It is unnecessary
to say that Oakeshott clearly thought that this attempt came, in its own way, to
its modern height in his own conception of it: in the conception of association
which was explored in the third essay in On Human Conduct in terms of the
idea societas. It was in these terms that he was determined not only to distin-
guish Hegel’s Staat from any particular state but also to distinguish his own
societas even more firmly from any particular state. He thought Hegel should
have put more distance between der Staat and modern European states; and he
thought that Hegel’s Staat was nothing other than an earlier consideration of
what he called societas.
It is important not to be misled by Oakeshott’s apparent determination to
interpret Hegel’s terminology. For it was by this means that he did justice to
his own rather than to Hegel’s philosophy. It was by distinguishing Hegel’s
language from his own that he was able to impose his own explanations on
Hegel’s conceptions: and, in so doing, to effect a fundamental reorientation.
Oakeshott’s philosophy, with its emphasis on the necessary conditionality of
everything, was grounded on a deliberate reticence about using language
carelessly. In On Human Conduct Oakeshott was perhaps more cautious
about the terminology of political philosophy than anyone else before or
since. The reason he used the words societas and universitas in the third essay
and words such as civitas, cives, lex and respublica in the second essay was
because he wanted terms for ‘ideal conditions’ and wanted to avoid the likeli-
hood that they would be ‘mistaken for the characteristics of historic and
equivocal associations’. He chose words with Latin origins because ‘these,
being somewhat archaic, [were] more easily detached from contingent cir-
cumstances’ and could not be confused with contemporary actual institu-
tions.59
His aim throughout On Human Conduct was to avoid ‘extraneous consider-
ations’: he did not want to explain the character of any actual association but
rather wanted to characterize ideal associations.60 So Oakeshott’s suggestion
58 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p. 121.
59 Ibid., pp. 108–9.
60 Oakeshott repeated his cautions again and again in the course of his exposition of









































that it had been injudicious of Hegel to use the word state was not simply a
criticism of Hegel or about the state: it was a criticism of any possible
misunderstanding within the framework of any philosophy about any piece of
terminology. Of the philosophers Oakeshott most admired for having written
philosophy which avoided ‘extraneous conditions’ — Aristotle, Hobbes and
Hegel — he criticized not only Hegel for his use of der Staat but also Aristotle
for his use of polis.61 It is significant that he said nothing about Hobbes’s ter-
minology: nothing about Leviathan or ‘commonwealth’, or even Hobbes’s
passing use of civitas or ‘state’.62 All that can be said is that at the time when
Oakeshott wrote about Hobbes, he was evidently not concerned with matters
of terminology at all: his introduction to the Leviathan, written in 1946, was
an excavation of Hobbes’s mind and his argument, not his language. But,
again, it may be significant that Oakeshott was concerned with what he called
Hobbes’s ‘nominalist and profoundly sceptical doctrine’, that is, the view that
words are just names for things. Since language was the ‘arbitrary precondi-
tion of all reasoning’, it followed that reasoning was not the understanding of
things but the understanding of the names of things and that knowledge was
conditional, not absolute.63 Now whether or not Oakeshott derived his later
scepticism from Hobbes is, in a sense, unimportant: no more important than
whether he derived his early idealism from Hegel.64 What has to be said here
is that Oakeshott was certainly expressing this sceptical doctrine by the for-
ties, and by the time he wrote On Human Conduct in the seventies was
sceptical about words such as der Staat and polis.
Oakeshott’s comment that it was perhaps injudicious of Hegel to use the
word der Staat was, then, not a mere aside but an expression of the coherent
philosophy displayed in On Human Conduct. It was a silently circular philoso-
phy which emphasized on the one hand the unconditionality of the engage-
ment to understand and the conditionality of everything else, including the
state, and the engagement to understand the state; and emphasized on the
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that he was dealing with the ideal, not any particular actual, and pp. 128 and 161 for
reminders that it was necessary to be careful with terminology. His comment about
Hegel’s use of the word Staat is just one of many repetitions of a general caution.
61 See the footnotes in Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, pp. 110 and 118. Oakeshott
was as willing to accommodate Aristotle to his own understanding as he was Hegel. Not-
withstanding the apparent difference between Hobbes and Aristotle due to the Aristote-
lian telos, Oakeshott was willing to ‘doubt whether, in the end, human excellence was,
for Aristotle, anything more substantial than deliberative self-enactment, and whether
the good polis was anything more than that which had the constitution best disposed for
deliberating and reaching genuinely common decisions about what to do in contingent
situations’. See ‘Logos and Telos’ (1974), in Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 355.
62 For Gerencser’s convincing explanation of why Oakeshott might not have wanted
to use ‘commonwealth’ see Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott, pp. 109–10 and 118.
63 See Oakeshott, ‘Introduction’, pp. xxiv–xxvi or pp. 242–4.
64 The former is emphasized by Gerencser in The Skeptic’s Oakeshott and the latter
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other hand the superiority of the conception of an ideal association in terms of
adventure rather than of one in terms of ends sought. This ideal association
was societas; and it was, in a sense, the political analogue of Oakeshott’s phi-
losophy as well as being the apparent consequence of it. The circularity was
constituted by the relation between the minimal conception of philosophy and
the minimal ideal of societas.
Although it would be possible to consider Hegel’s Staat an anticipation of
Oakeshott’s societas, as Oakeshott did, this would be to ignore not only some
of the distinctive characteristics of Hegel’s Staat but also the entirety of the
philosophy out of which Hegel’s Staat came. Oakeshott himself seems to
have treated even Hegel’s Staat as a conditional entity (or understanding of an
entity) which he then engaged with, interrogated and dissected in order to
reach the further refinement of societas. This is acceptable in itself — it does
justice to philosophy as Oakeshott conceived of it — but it did not do justice
to Hegel’s Staat which to some extent has to be seen as something uncondi-
tional, something in and for itself, if it is to be properly understood.
The state, for Hegel, was not a mere abstraction, not a mere ‘empty and
one-sided ratiocination’, not a mere opposition to another abstraction. It was
concrete, actual, existent. It was, according to the famous phrase, the actuality
of the ethical idea. Not merely an idea, and not merely an ethical idea but also
the actuality of that idea. An actuality: something which existed. It was
impossible for the state to have essence without existence, for it was an idea,
not a concept, and it was in the nature of an idea to exist. Hegel would have
said that societas and universitas were mere concepts — the actualities of
nothing at all, but mere conceptions of moral, legal or prudential association.
He had to consider the state because it was something which existed: he could
not baulk at existence. His purpose was to, for better or worse, portray the
state ‘as an inherently rational entity’ — not a particular state, not a utopian
state, not an ideal state but the state itself.65 Now, this should make it evident
that whatever this Staat was, it was not, when considered in and for itself —
when seen in terms of a philosophy which was not ‘an external activity of sub-
jective thought’ but saw that the object was ‘itself rational for itself’ — it was
not Oakeshott’s societas; although societas could be considered an attempt to
salvage something from the wreckage of Hegel’s Staat for modernity. In the
Philosophy of Right it was unconditional. Shipwreck had not occurred.
It may seem that part of the argument of this article has involved an unsubtle
attempt to deflate Oakeshott’s association of societas and der Staat. This is
not so: the argument is concerned to establish the temper of his approach to
societas and of Hegel’s approach to der Staat, and to consider how a compari-
son of the two affects the question of what it means to have attempted to gen-
erate a philosophical understanding of the state in the last two hundred years.
It is with this in mind that it is here considered desirable to deal with what









































Oakeshott, in treating der Staat as an anticipation of societas, left out of his
account of it.
III
The second part of this article has established that even though Hegel’s Staat
can be considered an anticipation of Oakeshott’s societas, it can be so only if
it is interpreted in terms of a minimal philosophy which renders it a minimal
conception of the state. This is exactly what Oakeshott did in On Human Con-
duct: where only philosophy, or understanding itself, was considered to be
unconditional. Everything else was conditional: actual states were condi-
tional because they were contingent, historical and accidental in origin; and
the two conceptions which Oakeshott supposed lay behind the state —
namely, societas and universitas — were conditional because they were ideal
and not actual. But the distinction between the ideal and the actual was not one
which was found in Hegel’s conception of philosophy: although it informed
the earlier stages of understanding, Hegel never supposed that understanding
should stop short of actuality. The ideal and the actual were reconciled in
Hegel; and so he had to confront der Staat: he could not retreat from actuality,
as Oakeshott did, but had to conceptualize, or, rather, understand the concep-
tion which existed within, der Staat. This is why Hegel did not think it was
injudicious to call what Oakeshott considered a merely ideal association der
Staat. If he had not called it der Staat, it would have existed nowhere: as
Oakeshott put it, it would have been poised between heaven and earth, or, as
Hegel put it, it would have hung in the air.66 In the third and final part of this
article it is necessary to consider what constituted der Staat insofar as it was
not merely an anticipation of societas but as something in and for itself. In
other words, what follows will consider what Oakeshott deliberately chose to
ignore when he suggested it was injudicious of Hegel to have used the word
state.
It is important to recognize that Hegel’s Staat did resemble Oakeshott’s
societas in certain respects. Both involved a definite philosophical concern to
avoid characterizing any particular historical state;67 both involved an empha-
sis on the modern recognition of what could variously be called subjectivity,
liberty or individuality; 68 and both involved an attempt to separate the
170 J. ALEXANDER
66 Ibid., 265, p. 287.
67 On their agreement on the importance of this distinction it is easy to find passages.
See, for instance, Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p. 122 and Hegel, Philosophy of Right,
3 and 258, pp. 30 and 276.
68 In a sense this was one of the great themes of the Philosophy of Right and On
Human Conduct. For instance, Hegel saw that ‘in the modern world human beings expect
their inner life to be respected’ (261, p. 285); and that the state had to support ‘the univer-
sal possibility which is available for the attainment of individual ends (236, p. 262).
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engagement of seeking to satisfy one’s wants and the engagement of consti-
tuting oneself in right. Neither the association Hegel called der Staat nor the
association Oakeshott called societas was to be mistaken for any actual, his-
torical, state: both were establishments which allowed freedom to be realized,
and both were something more — or less — than an association constituted in
terms of the ends it sought: both concerned the establishment, constitution
and maintenance of law, justice and morality. But in each of these three
respects there was a difference of emphasis which distinguished the idea of
der Staat from societas.
In each case, Hegel emphasized, far more than Oakeshott did, the positivity
of the state and the negativity of the moment which came before it, if taken by
itself.69 Hegel did this by emphasizing the difference between civil society
and the state not by philosophically separating an association (universitas)
which emphasized the satisfaction of wants from one which did not (societas)
but by crowning the stage of right concerned with the satisfaction of wants
(bürgerlich Gesellschaft) with another (der Staat) and by demonstrating that
even though the state only emerged in the third part of the Philosophy of Right
it was taken to be the actual precondition of those elements of right which pre-
ceded it dialectically, such as property, contract, morality, family and civil
society — and it was, in addition, not merely the guarantee of freedom, as it
was for Oakeshott, but the substantiality of freedom.70 The state was the rec-
onciliation of everything which came before, its achievement and also its pre-
condition — der Staat actually constituted the circularity of the Philosophy of
Right. This is why Hegel separated der Staat from every other form of right:
so it remained, philosophically, at its great vertiginous height at the third stage
of ethical life, ‘at which the momentous unification of self-sufficient
individuality with universal substantiality takes place’.71
The climactic arrival of der Staat in the structure in the Philosophy of Right,
its priority actually to any form of right and its achievement of unifying the
individual with the universal all suggest that there is reason to doubt that
Hegel’s Staat, when taken in itself, should be mistaken for Oakeshott’s
societas. Even though, in his own terms, Oakeshott was right to say that Hegel
could have avoided misunderstanding, it is likely that it was necessary for
Hegel to have risked misunderstanding. Hegel’s heightened language about
der Staat was not simply a contingent matter. The state was the ‘actuality of
the ethical idea’, it was ‘substantial’, it was ‘objective spirit’, it was the ‘high-
est duty’: it was where self-consciousness had its ‘substantial freedom’ and
had been recognized as an important part of European experience since the twelfth cen-
tury. See Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p. 239.
69 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 182, p. 220.
70 See for instance ibid., 261, p. 285.









































where the individual himself had ‘objectivity, truth and ethical life’.72 It was
the reconciliation of universality and individuality; it was the boundary where
the infinite met the finite; it was the ‘actuality of concrete freedom’: not only
‘an external necessity’ but the ‘immanent end’ of those subordinate to it: ‘its
strength consists in the unity of its universal and ultimate end with the particu-
lar interest of individuals’.73
It would therefore be superficial to attempt to analyse der Staat in terms of
societas and universitas: to portray it as either a heightened societas, a mini-
mal universitas, or some combination of both. For Hegel’s Staat was not the
reconciliation of two irreconcilables; but the recognition of something which
was already reconciled or rational in itself and had to be recognized to be as
such at the outset. Hegel’s heightened language about der Staat was there for
a reason and, indeed, was not merely a secular heightening. The state was not
merely an immanent, substantial and actual reconciliation of universality and
particularity: it was ‘the march of God in the world’. ‘In considering the idea
of the state,’ he said, ‘we must not have any particular states or particular
institutions in mind; instead, we should consider the Idea, this actual God, in
its own right.’74 The emphasis on the state as an idea might have been the
same as Oakeshott’s had not Hegel signalled that his subject was not a mere
ideal but an absolute unity beyond contingency, indivisible, universal, eter-
nal: the state as an unconditional object; and he went so far as to liken it to
God — ‘this actual God’. Now, Hegel was not sketching a theological politics
as such; but he nonetheless used divinity not only to suggest there was a rela-
tion between the state and religion but also to suggest that the state itself was
divine or had, at least, inherited something of whatever divinity it was which
had been manifested previously in the church.
It is not without significance that the longest section in the entirety of the
Philosophy of Right was that on the relation between state and religion.75
Hegel thought it was important to relate the state to religion because religion
had as its content ‘absolute truth’. It related everything to God ‘as the unlimited
foundation and cause on which everything depends’ and insisted that ‘every-
thing else should be seen in relation to this and should receive confirmation,
justification and the assurance of certainty from this source’. It followed that
it was from God that ‘the state, laws and duties all receive[d] their highest
endorsement as far as the consciousness [was] concerned’. Since this was so,
Hegel could not advocate the separation of church and state. If the church rep-
resented truth and justice and was separated from the state then the state could
not be other than a ‘secular regime of violence, arbitrariness and passion’. So,
according to his conception of right, state and church were said to differ only
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72 Ibid., 257 and 258, pp. 275–6.
73 Ibid., 260, 261, 262 and 264, esp. pp. 282–3.
74 Ibid., 258, p. 279.
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in form and not content, because the principles of the church which related to
ethical life necessarily harmonized with the state’s right. This was partly a
historical argument about the moment when a historic state came to know
itself ‘as the self-knowing ethical actuality of spirit’ by distinguishing itself
from the church (a distinction which, Hegel suggested, was only possible
when the church became ‘divided within itself’, allowing the unitary state to
stand above ‘particular churches’). But it was not only a historical argument.
For Hegel did not only think that the state had to some extent displaced the
church at some point during the sixteenth century; he also thought that it had
realized itself as a ‘divine will as present spirit, unfolding as the actual shape
and organisation of a world’. The state was not merely conceptual: it did not
merely have an essence: it also had existence: it was a subject. And he went so
far as to make an ontological argument for the state’s existence.
Those who refuse to go beyond the form of religion when confronted by the
state behave like those who, in the cognitive realm, claim to be right even if
they invariably stop at the essence instead of proceeding beyond this
abstraction to existence.76
Much of Hegel’s discussion concerned the actual relations between a church
and the state. He admitted in his comments that any particular state was ‘es-
sentially secular and finite’ whereas the church was infinite and universal but,
at the same time, he insist that ‘only a spiritless perception’ could regard der
Staat ‘as merely finite’. No doubt a ‘bad state’ was ‘purely secular and finite’
but the ‘rational state’, or der Staat, was ‘infinite within itself’. In der Staat,
then, religion was properly neither subordinate to or superior to der Staat but
sublimated within it. And this is why there were occasional suggestions that
‘we should venerate the state as an earthly divinity’.77
It is almost unnecessary to say that almost all of this went beyond anything
Oakeshott ever suggested about societas. In secular terms the difference
between der Staat and societas was the simple philosophical insistence that
the state should be understood as a unity — as an unconditional object. But
Hegel did not put his argument in secular terms. He likened the state to some
sort of divinity. ‘Predicates, principles, and the like’, he declared, ‘get us
nowhere in assessing the state, which must be apprehended as an organism,
just as predicates are of no help in comprehending God, whose life must
instead be intuited as it is in itself.’78 And if der Staat, or the state, were a
unity, like God, then it could not be broken into the sort of conceptual frag-
ments which Oakeshott called societas and universitas without admitting that
philosophy had failed.
76 Ibid., 270. pp. 292–3.
77 Ibid., 272, p. 307.









































The difference between Hegel and Oakeshott, between der Staat and
societas and between the philosophy of the Philosophy of Right and that of On
Human Conduct was not a matter of misunderstanding on Oakeshott’s part. It
was a matter of, if not the death of God, then certainly the abandonment of
God — of the absolute necessity to be modern.79 It was not just Oakeshott’s
attitude to the state but his attitude to God which shifted between the twenties
and the seventies. As we have seen, he began with a Hegelian understanding
of the problem of the state. In the early essay already mentioned he was aware
of the difficulty of simply separating the secular and the religious if a ‘complete
conception’ of the anything were to be sought. Indeed, he thought that ‘the
prospects of political thought today [were] darker even than those of theol-
ogy’.80 He did not think that a ‘complete conception of the state’ could be
‘constructed from the contributions of lesser and different conceptions’ for ‘a
complete conception was never achieved by adding together conceptions in
themselves imperfect’.81 Not only was the state, on an analogy with God, pos-
ited as something existing which mere philosophy had to attempt to reach: it
was something which was not to be mistaken for a ‘secular whole’. The state
was something necessarily in relation to God.
Were the state the mere secular whole it would be a vicious abstraction,
something which results from an arbitrary analysis of any community as we
know it and exists nowhere outside that analysis. This is not a question of
the so-called establishment of religion, or of the so-called ‘modern’ state;
society as it organises itself apart from God is an abstraction, and the state
cannot be identified with this secular whole without becoming an abstrac-
tion, and a conception which ends in an abstraction requires no further evi-
dence of its imperfection.82
Perhaps Oakeshott was not as clear about this conception as he could have
wished in the twenties because it was a conception of the state which was not
only related to God but in some sense modelled on God. ‘No one’, he
declared, ‘who has grasped the conception will require to be shown the locus
of a totality, or suppose it to be non-existent because he cannot designate it.’
This was theological language, although used perhaps mistakenly — as Hegel
had used it — of political rather than spiritual determinacies. ‘We are driven
from the more abstract to the less abstract until we reach the complete’,
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79 This is why it is impossible to agree with the suggestion that ‘self-enactment’ —
interpreted as authenticity — was, for Oakeshott, a ‘city of God’. For this view, see Glen
Worthington, ‘Michael Oakeshott and the City of God’, Political Theory, 28 (2000),
p. 394. Oakeshott was no doubt always sensitive to or nostalgic about religion. But Cowl-
ing’s view of Oakeshott’s religion in Religion and Public Doctrine, pp. 251–82, remains
unanswered (as well as unacknowledged in literature on Oakeshott).
80 Oakeshott, ‘The Authority of the State’, p. 80.
81 Ibid., pp. 80–1.
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Oakeshott remarked, unashamed at this early stage, of alluding to divinity.
‘When the gods appear, the half-gods disappear.’83 This is what he wrote in
the twenties; by the seventies the gods had died, the state with it, and the
half-gods of societas and universitas had emerged.
In On Human Conduct Oakeshott did not only associate the two distinct
ideals associations, societas and universitas, with two distinct dispositions,
the disposition to seek adventure and the disposition to seek ends: but also
associated each association or disposition with a distinct deity — ‘since men
are apt to make gods whose characters reflect what they believe to be their
own’. The deity of societas or adventure was ‘an Augustinian god of majestic
imagination’ who sought humans ‘capable of answering back in civil tones
with whom to pass eternity in conversation’; while the deity of universitas or
ends was a god ‘suspected of being somewhat niggardly’ for he was ‘the pro-
prietor of an estate of vast resources’ who sought to providentially offer
humans the ‘substantial benefits’ of nature.84 This was a final flourish: but it
was not an insignificant one, for here Oakeshott more or less made it evident
that God was something which philosophy could not discuss without bringing
Him down into one-sided caricature. This was not Hegel’s view of God; nor
was it his view of der Staat. It is not too much to say that if Hegel had aban-
doned even the words ‘der Staat’ he could not have written the Philosophy of
Right at all. Perhaps he could only have written, as Oakeshott perhaps
intended, an anticipation of On Human Conduct.
What we have by the end of this article is the judgment that Oakeshott’s
conception of societas was a sidestepping of the attempt to find totality, unity
and conviction in either the state or, for that matter, in anything else. Except as
a literary aside, Oakeshott abandoned the analogy between God and the state
altogether. If he had a god at all by the end it was no more than Hobbes’s deus
mortalis, which, as Schmitt argued, was nothing more than the work of man,
an artifice, a minimal state — not to be confused with the state of Hegel, and
nothing to do with God.85 But there is a silence about this subject in Oakeshott
which is especially evident when one compares his conception of societas to
Hegel’s of der Staat. Perhaps this silence was his tribute to modernity — a
gesture at an open infinity rather than a closed, bounded, one. What Oakeshott’s
comment on Hegel expressed was a remarkable attempt to sketch an ideal of
the state in a lean, minimal and secular manner: for he managed to recover
what he thought was of value in political philosophy in terms of a calculated
83 Ibid., p. 84.
84 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, pp. 324–5.
85 ‘The state is not a work of art.’ See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 258, p. 279. For the
difference between Hobbes’s god and Hegel’s god see Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the
State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans.
George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Westport, CT, 1996), pp. 32–3 and 100. It is of sig-









































reticence about the possibility of using established or customary political lan-
guage — such as der Staat in Hegel or polis in Aristotle — as the foundation
for a proper philosophical understanding of association. Whether this was an
advance or a retreat for political philosophy is a question of great contempo-
rary importance. May it be considered elsewhere.
James Alexander BILKENT UNIVERSITY
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